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Levine and Pearlman (1992) and Levine (1993) perform a numerical analysis of the interaction between
1
fiscal and monetary policies in the EMU. Bryson, Jensen and Van Hoose (1993) and Bryson (1994) study
monetary and fiscal coordination in a model of two interdependent economies which produce imperfectly
substitutable goods. To keep the analysis of the trade-off between credibility and flexibility tractable, we will
assume perfectly substitutable goods.
Calvo and and Guidotti (1993) also highlight the role of seigniorage revenues in macroeconomic
2
stabilization for a variety of shocks in a model with monetary policy pre-commitment.
1. Introduction
The plans for a European Monetary Union (EMU) have motivated a growing body of
research on the optimal design of the common central bank. Much of this literature draws on the
seminal work of Rogoff (1985) who showed that an optimally designed central bank involves a
trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Extending this type of analysis to a monetary union,
Laskar (1989) investigates how the optimal degree of conservatism of the central bank depends on
the relative importance of common and idiosyncratic shocks. Alesina and Grilli (1992) focus on the
degree of political independence of a European Central Bank (ECB) and the voting rules for the
appointment of the ECB board members. Also Von Hagen and Süppel (1994) explore how the
members of the central bank's council should be appointed and selected.
In contrast to monetary policy, fiscal policy remains largely a national responsibility within
the EMU. The analytical literature on European monetary unification has paid relatively little
attention to the role of national fiscal policies and their interaction with the common monetary
policy. In a closed economy setting with national monetary policymaking, the interaction between
1
monetary and fiscal policy has been analyzed by Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993) and
Debelle and Fischer (1994). This paper draws on this literature to investigate how national fiscal
policies interact with the common monetary policy in a monetary union. In fact, in the tradition of
Phelps (1973) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987), we explore the role of monetary policy from a
public finance perspective. In particular, the Barro-Gordon model of nominal wage contracting
employed by Rogoff (1985) to investigate the trade-off between credibility and flexibility is
extended to a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policymaking. Within this framework with
endogenous fiscal policy, adverse output shocks are stabilized not only through the traditional
channel of inflation surprises (as in Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985), and Laskar (1989))
but also through lower taxes financed by additional seigniorage revenues and lower public
2
spending. In this way, stabilization policy involves not only monetary but also fiscal policy. We
find, in contrast to Rogoff (1985), that an optimally designed central bank, which ignores the social
role of seigniorage, may be less conservative than society.
We show that, compared to the case with national monetary policymaking, stabilization
policy in the EMU relies more on fiscal policy because country-specific shocks cannot be stabilized
by the common monetary policy. The reduced stabilization role of monetary policy in a monetary
union implies that, compared to the case with national monetary policies, the optimally designed
central bank is more conservative in that it attaches a higher priority to price stability. Whereas
2Morales and Padilla (1995) study the role of a supranational transfer system in attaining the Pareto
3
efficient cooperative outcome in a world composed of self-interested countries, whose monetary policies yield
international spill-overs.
monetary unification thus reduces both expected inflation and the variance of inflation, it harms
overall welfare by reducing average output and public spending and increasing the variability of
these variables. However, a properly designed system of international transfers may avoid this
decline in welfare. In fact, countries would like to enter an economic and monetary union if this
union involves international transfers stabilizing country-specific shocks. Intuitively, compared to
national monetary and fiscal policies, international transfers are a more effectieve device to insure
countries against adverse shocks.
3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
assumes that not only fiscal but also monetary policy is set at the national level. Both dependent
and independent national central banks are considered. The case with national monetary
policymaking explored in Section 3 serves as a benchmark for the analysis in Section 4, which is
the heart of the paper. This section investigates the interaction between a union-wide monetary
policy set by the common central bank (CCB) and decentralized fiscal policies set by the member
states of the EMU. The analyses in Sections 3 and 4 are conducted in three steps. First, we study
the macroeconomic effects on the level and variability of inflation, output, and public spending.
Second, the welfare impacts are explored. Finally, we analyze the optimal design of the monetary
institutions. Section 5 allows international transfers to stabilize country-specific shocks. Section 6
concludes.
2. The model
We will consider a monetary union which consists of n participating countries. Whereas
labour is immobile internationally, there is a single commodity which is perfectly substitutable and
perfectly tradable. Accordingly, the price level is uniform across the union. The private sectors and
the fiscal authorities of the participating countries and the common central bank (CCB) of the
union are involved in a game. The assumptions about the timing are as follows. First, nominal
wages are concluded. Second, output shocks (see below) occur. Third, policy decisions are
implemented. Finally, firms set output and employment.
Following, among others, Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993), Debelle and
Fischer (1994) and Jensen (1994), we assume that workers in each country are represented by trade
unions whose sole objective is to achieve a target expected real wage rate, the logarithm of which
we normalize to zero. Therefore, the (log) of the nominal wage rate is set equal to the expected
(log) price level, E(p). Expectations are rational. Hence, the subjective price expectation of wage
3Since wage contracts are signed before policies are selected, unions act as Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis
4
the authorities.
From the definitions of µ and T , and the properties of > and P , we have that E(T )=0 i, E(µT )=0 i,
5
i i i i
and E(TT )=0 i,j such that ij. Moreover, one has F /E(µ )=F /(1-0) and F /E(T )=F /(1-0) .i j µ > Ti i Pi
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
setters, p , equals the mathematical expectation which follows from the model, i.e. p =E(p).
e e 4
Output of a representative firm in country i (i=1,..,n) is given by:
Y = L exp(>+P ), 0<0<1. (2.1)i i i
0
where L is labor, > represents a common shock hitting the entire union and P is an identicallyi i
distributed idiosyncratic shock hitting the economy of country i only. We assume that E(>)=0,
E(P )=0 i, E(>P )=0 i, and E(P P )=0 i,j such that ij. Moreover, we define F /E(> ) andi i i j >
2 2
F /E(P ).
Pi i
2 2
Output in country i is taxed at a rate J . The firm maximizes profits (1-J )PL exp(>+P )-i i i i
0
WL , where P and W represent, respectively, the price level and the wage rate (which are uniformi
across the entire union). Hence, (log) output is given by y = (0/(1-0))(B-B -J +log0)+(>+P )/(1-0),i i i
e
where B denotes the inflation rate, B represents the expected (by wage setters) inflation rate ande
log(1-J ) has been approximated by -J . For convenience, we normalize output by subtracting thei i
constant (0/(1-0))log0 from y . Moreover, we redefine the common and idiosyncratic shocks byi
µ/>/(1-0) and T /P /(1-0), respectively. Normalized output, x , thus amounts toi i i
5
x = <(B-B -J )+µ+T , where </0/(1-0)>0. (2.2)i i i
e
A favorable supply shock µ+T >0 raises the marginal productivity of labor, thereby inducing firmsi
to hire more labour. Thus, output increases on account of not only the direct effect of the positive
supply shock but also the expansion of employment.
In the absence of tax distortions and stochastic shocks, x =0 in a rational expectationsi
equilibrium (where B=B and µ=T =0, see (2.2)). In addition to distortionary output taxes, we allowe i
for other, non-tax, distortions due to, for example, union power in the labor market or monopoly
power in commodity markets. The first-best output level, i.e. output with neither tax nor non-tax
distortions, is denoted by x . Thus, x >0 measures the non-tax distortions and can be interpreted asi i
an implicit tax on output.
Society i's welfare loss function differs from that of the trade unions, because it accounts
for the preferences of not only workers but also non-workers. Society i's preferences, which are
defined over inflation, output and public spending, are represented by the following loss function:
V = ½ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], " ," >0. (2.3)S,i BS i i gS i i BS gS
2 2 2
4Employment and output are directly related through the production function. Hence, instead of output,
6
employment could have been included in the objective functions, with the target employment level
corresponding to the employment level in absence of any distortions.
In the limiting case of " 64, the government spending share is set exogenously at g .
7
gS i
For a derivation, see Appendix A in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995a).
8
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Jensen (1994), among
9
others, assume that 6=1. However, as will become clear below, a non-unitary value of 6 plays an important
role in our analysis.
Welfare losses increase in the deviations of inflation, (log) output and government spending (g isi
government spending as a share of non-distortionary output) from their targets. The target level of
6
inflation corresponds to price stability while the target for output is given by its non-distortionary
level, x . The target for government spending, g , can be interpreted as the optimal share of non-i i
distortionary output to be spent on public goods if sufficient lump-sum taxes are available (see
Debelle and Fischer, 1994). Parameters " and " stand for the weights of the price stability and
BS gS
public spending objectives, respectively, relative to the weight of the output objective, which is
normalized to unity. All countries feature the same relative preference weights. Targets for
7
employment and public spending, in contrast, are allowed to vary across countries, reflecting
different labor market institutions and preferences for public goods.
Each country features a fiscal authority or government. The loss function of the government
of country i amounts to
V = ½ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], " >0. (2.4)F,i BF i i gS i i BF
2 2 2
We allow the governments' price stability weight, " , to differ from society's price stability weight,
BF
" , because, as shown by Rogoff (1985), society may be better off by appointing a policymaker
BS
whose preferences diverge from society's.
The government faces the following budget constraint
8
g + (1+D) d = J + 6B + 2 , (2.5)i i i i
where D denotes the (constant) real interest rate, d $0 represents the stock of single-period indexedi
government debt, and 6$0 stands for the constant ratio of real money holdings (expressed as9
shares of output in the absence of distortions and stochastic shocks). Total seigniorage revenues
collected by the CCB are equally distributed among the participants and are thus given by 6B for
an individual country. The government can employ only a limited, exogenous amount of lump-sum
taxation, which as a share of output in absence of distortions and shocks equals 2 .i
We can rewrite the government budget constraint (2.5) as follows (by using (2.2)):
5As will be shown below, the relative magnitudes of the deterministic and stochastic components of the
10
government financing requirement are important factors in the optimal design of monetary institutions, which
typically involves a trade-off between credibility and flexibility (see Rogoff (1985) and Cukierman (1992)).
For a complete derivation of the solutions, see Appendix A. Note that the relevant expression for the
11
government budget constraint is given by substituting B for B into (2.5).i
GFR / K - (µ+T )/< = [(x -x )/<] + 6B + [g -g ] + [B-B ]. (2.6)i i i i i i i
e
where
K / g + (1+D)d + x /< - 2 . (2.7)i i i i i
The government financing requirement, GFR , consists of a deterministic component, K , and ai i
stochastic component, -(µ+T )/<. The deterministic component amounts to the governmenti
10
spending target g , debt servicing costs, (1+D)d , and a labor subsidy aimed at offsetting the impliciti i
tax on output, x /<, net of the maximum amount of lump-sum taxes. The last right-hand side ofi
(2.6) represents the four sources of finance. The first three terms correspond to the three
components of the loss function, indicating that financing the government financing requirement is
costly in terms of society's welfare. An inflation surprise is the fourth source of finance.
3. National monetary policymaking
In order to assess the effects of monetary unification, we first explore the benchmark of
national monetary policymaking in some country i (i=1,..,n). As in Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1995a), the first-best equilibrium (which yields zero welfare losses) is attained if a single
benevolent policymaker, who sets both monetary and fiscal policy, can freely employ lump-sum
taxation. If the use of lump-sum taxation is restricted (i.e. 2 < g +(1+D)d +x /<), the resultingi i i i
equilibrium is second-best as long as the policymaker can commit to the optimal state-contingent
rule. In this paper, however, we assume, rather realistically, that policymakers cannot commit. The
absence of commitment gives rise to additional welfare losses.
3.1. Centralized policymaking
With centralized policymaking, the government of country i selects not only fiscal policy
(taxation and public spending) but also monetary policy (B ). This case can be interpreted as that ofi
a dependent central bank. The equilibrium outcomes for 6B , g -g and (x -x )/< are contained ini i i i i
Table 1. Compared to the stochastic component, the deterministic component of the GFR exerts
11
i
larger adverse impacts on price stability, output, and public spending. The reason for the relatively
large negative impact of the deterministic component on the three determinants of welfare (i.e.
inflation, output, and public spending) is that inflation surprises (i.e. the fourth source of finance at
the right-hand side of (2.6)) contributes to the financing of only the stochastic component of the
E(VS,i) '
"
BS(6%1)2/"2BF%1/<2%1/"gS
2D 2
˜K2i %
"
BS(6%1)2/"2BF%1/<2%1/"gS
2(D()2
F
2
µ%F
2
Ti
<
2
,
6
government financing requirement. Indeed, the coefficients of the deterministic component, K , ini
the expressions for 6B , g -g and (x -x )/< sum to unity, while the corresponding coefficients of thei i i i i
stochastic component, (µ+T )/<, sum to less than one. Only if the coefficient for the inflationi
surprise is added do these latter coefficients add up to unity, as required by the government
financing requirement (2.6).
Inflation surprises cannot contribute to the financing of the deterministic component
because wage setters feature rational expectations and thus anticipate the effect of the expected
government financing requirement, K , on inflation when setting wages. Accordingly, a largeri
deterministic component raises inflation expectations. However, wage setters cannot anticipate the
stochastic component of the government financing requirement because the stochastic shocks occur
only after wage constracts have been signed. Accordingly, as far as the stochastic part of the
government financing requirement is concerned, inflation expectations are exogenous. Inflation
surprises, therefore, can contribute to the financing of the stochastic component.
An adverse output shock is stabilized through three channels (corresponding to the three
non-output sources of financing at the last right-hand side of (2.6)): additional seigniorage, a cut in
public spending raising the spending gap (g -g ), and an inflation surprise. The first and secondi i
channel allow for lower explicit taxes, while the third channel operates like an implicit output
subsidy financed by employees. This latter channel has received scant attention in the literature.
The first two channels, which involve fiscal policy, in contrast, have been largely ignored.
Welfare
Society i's equilibrium expected welfare loss amounts to (Appendix A)
(3.1)
where D/6(6+1)/" +1/< +1/" and D /(6+1) /" +1/< +1/" . Society's welfare loss is thus
BF gS BF gS
2 * 2 2
composed of a term arising from the deterministic component of the government financing
requirement and a term associated with the corresponding stochastic component. The coefficient in
front of (F +F )/< is smaller than that in front of the deterministic component (because D >D).µ Ti
2 2 2 *
Intuitively, financing the stochastic component is least costly because it can in part be financed
through inflation surprises as inflation expectations are not affected. The deterministic component,
in contrast, is especially costly in terms of additional welfare losses because it raises inflation
expectations as wage setters anticipate its inflationary consequences.
Optimal institutions
To find the optimal price stability weight of the policymaker, " , we differentiate E(V )
BF S,i
with respect to " , to yield:
BF
where T1/
6&"
BS(6%1)/"BF
D 3
, T2/
(6%1)(1&"
BS/"BF)
(D()3
.
7
In Rogoff's (1985) model the optimal degree of central bank conservatism depends only on supply
12
shocks and not on the other shocks included in his model.
For " #" , T <0 and T #0, hence ME(V )/M" <0. For " $(6+1)" /6, T $0 and T >0, hence
13
BF BS 1 2 S,i BF BF BS 1 2
ME(V )/M" >0. Hence, the value of " which minimizes E(V ) lies between " and (6+1)" /6.S,i BF BF S,i BS BS
ME(V )/M" = ((6+1)/" )(1/< +1/" )[T K + T (F +F )/< ], (3.2)S,i BF BF gS 1 i 2 µ Ti
2 2 2 2 2 2
In the absence of stochastic shocks, the welfare loss is minimised if " =(6+1)" /6. The
BF BS
government thus should be more conservative than society in the sense that it attaches a higher
priority to price stability (i.e. " >" ). This is a typical second best result: introducing a distortion
BF BS
(i.e. letting the preferences of the authorities diverge from those of society) in an already distorted
world (due to the absence of commitment) may improve welfare. In the absence of commitment, the
government takes inflation expectations as given and thus ignores the impact of its policy decisions
on the inflation expectations of wage setters. An upward adjustment of the price stability weight
induces the government to internalize the additional social costs of expansionary monetary policies
in terms of higher inflation expectations.
The result that a conservative policymaker helps to offset welfare losses due to the absence
of commitment was first noted by Rogoff (1985) in a model without fiscal policy. In Rogoff's
12
model, anticipated inflation does not play any useful social role because seigniorage is absent (i.e.
6=0). Accordingly, minimization of the credibility component of the welfare loss would require an
ultraconservative central banker (i.e. " would be infinite). In our model, in contrast, a finite price
BF
stability is optimal, even from the point of view of minimizing the deterministic losses (as long as
money holdings are positive, i.e. 6>0).
In the other extreme case that the deterministic part of the government financing
requirement is zero, the welfare loss is minimized if " =" . If the government financing
BF BS
requirement consists only of stochastic shocks, the policymaker does not face any commitment
problems as inflation expectations are exogenously given. Accordingly, preferences do not need to
be distorted to internalize the endogenous impact of discretionary policies on inflation expectations.
In the presence of both credibility problems (i.e. K >0) and stochastic shocks (i.e.i
F +F >0), the optimal value of " , denoted by " , lies between " and (6+1)" /6.µ Ti BF BF BS BS
2 2 opt 13
Accordingly, the optimally designed policymaker is more conservative than society. At " , T <0
BF 1
opt
and T >0. Hence, making the optimally designed central bank a bit more conservative yields first-2
order welfare losses from the point of view of stabilizing stochastic shocks but first-order welfare
gains from the point of view of gaining credibility in terms of lower inflation expectations. The
optimal central bank is thus too conservative from the point of view of stabilizing the stochastic
shocks (i.e. flexibility) but not conservative enough from the point of view of gaining credibility.
Therefore, society faces a trade-off between flexibility (or stabilization) and credibility or, in terms
Bi '
<
2
"
BM%<
2
B
e
i%Ji%
x˜i&(µ%Ti)
<
.
8
The implicit function theorem yields M" /M((F +F )/ K ) = - [MLHS /M((F +F )/ K )] /
14 opt 2 2 2 2 2 2
BF µ T i (3.2) µ T i
[MLHS /M" ], where " =" . The conditions for an internal minimum of E(V ) at " require that(3.2) BF BF BF S,i BF
opt opt
MLHS /M" >0 at " . Moreover, MLHS /M((F +F )/ K ) = ((6+1)/" )(1/< +1/" )T K /< >0 at " ,(3.2) BF BF (3.2) µ T i BF gS 2 i BF
opt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 opt
because " <" <(6+1)" /6.BS BF BS
opt
In fact, the public spending weight " is irrelevant for the outcomes, and could as well be set equal to
15
gM
zero.
of the fiscal terminology of this paper, between optimally financing the unanticipated (i.e.
stochastic) and the anticipated (i.e. deterministic) component of the government financing
requirement.
The optimal price stability weight depends on the relative magnitudes of the two
components of the government financing requirement. The larger the stochastic component becomes
relative to the deterministic component (as indicated by a larger ratio (F +F )/ K ), the moreµ T i
2 2 2
important is flexibility compared to credibility and thus the lower becomes the optimal price
stability weight.
14
3.2. Decentralized policymaking
With decentralized policymaking, an independent central bank sets discretionary monetary
policy, while fiscal policy continues to be determined by the government. The central bank and the
government play a Nash game. Hence, both policymakers determine their policies simultaneously,
taking each other's policies as given.
The central bank's loss function is given by
V = ½ [" B + (x -x ) + " (g -g ) ], " >0, " $0. (3.3)M,i BM i i i gM i i BM gM
2 2 2 15
This yields the following reaction function (see Appendix B):
(3.4)
Larger (tax and non-tax) distortions in output and labor markets and higher expected inflation cause
the monetary authority to raise inflation in order to protect employment. Adverse supply shocks act
like implicit taxes on output and thus induce the CCB to offset these "taxes" through unanticipated
inflation.
Macroeconomic effects
As in the case of centralization, inflation surprises contribute to the financing of only the
stochastic component of the GFR . Hence, the coefficients of the deterministic component in thei
equilibrium outcomes for 6B , g -g and (x -x )/< add up to one, while the coefficients of thei i i i i
E(VS,i) '
"
BS/"
2
BM%1/<2%1/"gS
2N 2D
˜K2i %
"
BS/"
2
BM%1/<2%1/"gS
2(N (D)2
F
2
µ%F
2
Ti
<
2
,
where T3/
6&"
BS/"BM
N 3D
, T4/
(6%1)&"
BS/"BM
(N(D)3
.
9
Appendix B contains a derivation of the solutions.
16
stochastic part of GFR sum to less than one (see Table 1).i
16
If the price stability weight of the central bank coincides with that of the government (i.e.
" =" ), the output gap (i.e. ( x -x )/<) and the spending gap are on average larger under
BM BF i i
decentralization than under centralization. Seigniorage, in contrast, is on average smaller under
decentralization. The reason is that an independent central bank fails to internalize the government
budget constraint and thus ignores the role of seigniorage in financing the government financing
requirement. The macroeconomic outcomes under centralization and decentralization coincide with
each other only if real money holdings are zero so that seigniorage revenues are absent.
Table 2 presents the variances of inflation, public spending, and output. These variances
indicate that decentralized policymaking implies that inflation is less variable (assuming " =" ).
BM BF
Output is less successfully stabilized, although fiscal policy plays a more important role in
stabilization policy as indicated by a higher variance of public spending.
Welfare
Society i's expected welfare loss amounts to (see Appendix B)
(3.5)
where N /6/" +1/< +1/" and N /(6+1)/" +1/< +1/" . As with centralized policymaking, theD BM gS D BM gS
2 * 2
deterministic component of the government financing requirement is relatively costly because it
raises inflation expectations and thus cannot be financed through inflation surprises. Consequently,
the coefficient in front of the deterministic component (i.e. the term between brackets in the first
term at the right-hand side of (3.5)) exceeds the coefficient in front of the variances of the shocks
(i.e. the first factor in brackets in the second term at the right-hand side of (3.5)).
The optimal central bank
To find the optimal price stability weight of the independent central bank, we differentiate
(3.5) with respect to " to obtain:
BM
ME(V )/M" = (1/" )(1/< +1/" )[T K + T (F +F )/< ], (3.6)S,i BM BM gS 3 i 4 µ Ti
2 2 2 2 2 2
The welfare loss arising from the deterministic component of the government financing requirement
is minimized if " =" /6. The welfare loss arising from the stochastic component of the
BM BS
10
This can be seen from (3.6) by noting that T is negative (positive) if " <(>)" /6, while T is
17
3 BM BS 4
negative (positive) if " <(>)" /(6+1).BM BS
The implicit function theorem yields M" /M((F +F )/ K ) = - [MLHS /M((F +F )/ K )] /
18 opt 2 2 2 2 2 2
BM µ Ti i (3.6) µ Ti i
[MLHS /M" ], where " =" . The conditions for an internal minimum at " require that(3.6) BM BM BM BM
opt opt
MLHS /M" >0 at " . Moreover, MLHS /M((F +F )/ K ) = (1/" )(1/< +1/" )T K /< >0 at " ,(3.6) BM BM (3.6) µ Ti i BM gS 4 i BM
opt 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 opt
because " /(6+1)<" <" /6.BS BM BS
opt
government financing requirement reaches its minimum for " =" /(6+1). The optimal price
BM BS
stability weight balances credibility and flexibility and thus lies between these two extremes
" /(6+1) and " /6. Moreover, as in the case of centralized policymaking, the optimal price
BS BS
17
stability weight declines if stochastic shocks become relatively more important (as indicated by a
larger ratio (F +F )/ K ).µ Ti i
2 2 2 18
With an independent central bank, the optimal price stability weights for minimizing the
stochastic and deterministic components of the welfare losses are smaller than under centralized
policymaking. The reason is that an independent central bank ignores the social value of
seigniorage in relaxing the government financing requirement. A smaller price stability weight is an
indirect instrument to have the independent central bank internalize this social value of inflation.
The social value of seigniorage causes our result to differ from that obtained by Rogoff
(1985). He finds that the optimal central bank should always be more conservative than society.
Intuitively, the only distortion in his model is the absence of commitment. In our model, in
contrast, another distortion is present, namely the failure of the independent central bank to account
for the social value of seigniorage. The optimal central bank is more conservative than society only
if the distortions implied by the absence of commitment are large compared to the distortions due
to the failure to internalize the social value of seigniorage. This is the case if, first, the
deterministic component of the government financing requirement is large compared to the
stochastic component and, second, real money holdings are small. The first condition ensures that
commitment problems are relatively serious. The second condition implies that the social value of
seigniorage is only small. Indeed, if money holdings are zero (i.e. 6=0), we reproduce Rogoff's
result that the optimal central bank is unambiguously more conservative than society. Debelle
(1993) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) assume that the money-output ratio is unity (i.e. 6=1). With
these relatively large money holdings, the optimal central bank should be less conservative than
society (unless stochastic shocks are absent). If 0<6<1, the central bank should be more
conservative than society from the point of view of minimizing the deterministic loss (since 6<1)
but less conservative than society from the point of view of minimizing the loss associated with the
stochastic stocks (since 6>0). Accordingly, the optimal central bank may be more or less
conservative than society depending on the relative importance of the stochastic versus the
deterministic component of the government financing requirement.
4. Monetary union
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These are derived in Appendix B.
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In a monetary union, a common central bank (CCB) selects the inflation rate, which is
uniform across the union. Fiscal policy continues to be selected at the national level. Policymakers
continue to play Nash. Hence, they determine their policies simultaneously, taking as given each
others' policies.
The CCB features the following welfare loss function:
V = ½ {" B + 3 [(x -x ) +" (g -g ) ]/n}, " >0, " $0, (4.1)CCB BM i =1 i i gM i i BM gM
2 n 2 2
If " =" and " =" , the objective function of the CCB is an equally weighted average of the
BM BS gM gS
individual societies' objective functions.
The CCB is not able to commit. It thus minimizes (4.1) subject to (2.2), i=1,..,n, taking as
given not only tax rates and public spending ratios but also expected inflation B . The resulting
e
reaction function amounts to (compare to (3.4)):
(4.2)
Macroeconomic effects
Table 1 contains the equilibrium outcomes. The expression for inflation is of the same
19
general form as that under decentralized national policy making. However, in a monetary union,
inflation cannot be attuned to country-specific circumstances. Instead, it is determined by union
averages.
The expressions for the spending and output gaps are a bit more complicated. In
interpreting these expressions, we distinguish between average and country-specific components of
the government financing requirement. Monetary policy can finance only the average components
K and (µ+T )/<. Indeed, in a monetary union, policy responds in the same way to averageA A
variables as national policies do to country-specific variables with national monetary policymaking.
Hence, the coefficients associated with the average components of the government financing
requirement in the expressions for the spending and output gaps coincide with the corresponding
coefficients under decentralized, national policymaking.
In a monetary union, monetary policy cannot contribute to financing the country-specific
components ( K - K ) and (T -T )/<. Indeed, ( K - K ) and (T -T )/< do not feature in the expressionA i A i A i A i
for inflation. The loss of monetary policy as an instrument to finance country-specific components
has implications for the level and variance of output and public spending. In particular, output is
more sensitive to country-specific components than to average components. Accordingly, the
coefficients in front of ( K - K ) and (T -T )/< in the expression for output exceed the correspondingA i A i
coefficients in front of K and (µ+T )/<. Moreover, the variance of output is larger in a monetaryA A
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With very small money holdings (i.e. 6=0, which corresponds to the case of Rogoff, 1985), the average20
deterministic component exerts the same impact on output and spending as the country-specific components.
However, even if 6=0, monetary policy continues to perform a useful role in stabilizing average stochastic
shocks.
If n=1, (4.3) reduces to (3.5), the welfare loss under decentralized national monetary policymaking.
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union because neither seigniorage nor inflation surprises can help to stabilize country-specific
shocks (see Table 2).
Another implication of the loss of monetary policy to finance country-specific components
is that fiscal policy has to bear the entire burden of financing these components. Indeed, public
spending is more sensitive to the country-specific components of the government financing
requirement than to the corresponding average component (see Table 1). The larger stabilization
role of fiscal policy is reflected also in the larger variance of the public spending gap in a union
(see Table 2).
We can use the results in Table 1 to order the sensitivity of the output and spending gaps
with respect to the four components of the government financing requirement. In particular, the
average stochastic component is stabilized best in the sense that it exerts the smallest impact on
output and spending. The reason is that not only seigniorage but also inflation surprises contribute
to the financing of this component. The average deterministic component is an intermediate case as
far as its impact on output and spending is concerned. Union-wide monetary policy contributes to
the financing of this component by generating seigniorage. However, with rational wage setters
20
anticipating inflation, monetary policy cannot generate inflation surprises and is thus less effective
in reducing the variations in output and spending than for the average stochastic component. The
country-specific (stochastic and deterministic) components exert the largest impact on the output
and spending gaps because monetary policy cannot play any role in financing these components
(i.e. neither through seigniorage nor through inflation surprises).
Welfare
From now on, the deterministic components of the government financing requirements and
the variances of the idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be uniform across the union (i.e. K = K andi
F =F for all i). Under these assumptions, the equilibrium welfare loss amounts to (see
Ti T
2 2 21
Appendix B):
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If the idiosyncratic shocks are absent, the government financing requirements in all countries coincide.
22
With perfect convergence of government financing requirements, monetary policy does not need to be attuned
to country-specific circumstances.
(4.3)
If it leaves the preference weights unaffected, monetary unification (i.e. an increase in the number
of countries n) raises welfare if the coefficient of (F /n)/2< in the last term at the right-hand side
T
2 2
of (4.3) is positive. This condition can be reduced to
(4.4)
Thus, monetary unification enhances welfare only if the central bank is substantially less
conservative than society. Intuitively, if condition (4.4) is met, inflation plays an excessive role in
stabilizing output. Monetary unification acts as an indirect instrument to reduce the excessive
stabilization because in a monetary union monetary policy can no longer be used as effectively to
stabilize country-specific shocks (T -T )/<.A i
In practice, the central bank is not likely to be less conservative than society. For example,
monetary unification unambiguously harms welfare if the price stability weight of the central bank
coincides with the society's corresponding preference weight (" =" ). In this case, the central
BM BS
bank's price stability weight exceeds the optimal price stability weight from a stabilization point of
view, " /(6+1). Accordingly, by reducing the stabilization role of monetary policy, monetary
BS
unification moves the degree of stabilization even further from its optimum, thereby harming
welfare. These adverse welfare effects of unification are avoided only if the idiosyncratic shocks
would be absent (i.e. F =0) so that not only the deterministic components but also the stochastic
T
2
components of the government financing requirement would converge.
22
Expression (4.3) indicates when the less effective use of monetary policy as an instrument
to stabilize country-specific shocks in a monetary union is particularly serious. This is the case if,
first, country-specific shocks are important (as indicated by large values for F ), second, monetary
T
2
policy is an effective instrument to stabilize output and, third, compared to monetary policy, fiscal
policy is especially costly as an instrument of stabilization policy. The second condition is met if
the short-run Phillipscurve is steep so that inflation surprises are an effective instrument to stabilize
output. The third condition for monetary policy to be a valuable instrument of stabilization policy
is met if a small price stability weight " indicates that fluctations in inflation are not costly while
BS
a large public spending weight " indicates that fluctuations in public spending are especiallygS
costly.
14
In this experiment, we raise the ratio F /F while keeping constant the overall variance of the shocks,23 2 2
T µ
F +F .µ T
2 2
This result is reminiscent of Laskar (1989) who analyses the optimal degree of central bank
24
conservatism in open economies with imperfectly substitutable commodities and national monetary policies.
He shows that the national central banks should be made more conservative if shocks become more
idiosyncratic.
The expressions for the variability of output and public spending in Table 2 are increasing in both n
25
and the price stability weight of the central bank. Accordingly, this variability increases for two reasons. First,
with given preferences of the central bank, the central bank is less effective in stabilization if the union grows.
Second, the union members find it optimal to raise the price stability weight of the central bank. This reduces
the stabilization role of monetary policy further, thereby increasing the variability of output and spending.
To see this more formally, write E(V ) as a function V of " and n, and let " (p) denote the26 optS,i BM BM
optimal " for a union of size p. Hence, by definition of " (p) one has that V(" (m),m) <
BM BM BM
opt opt
V(" (m+1),m) < V(" (m+1),m+1), which is the welfare loss under an optimal union of size m+1. The
BM BM
opt opt
last inequality holds because the coefficient of (F /n)/(2< ) in (4.3) is negative at " =" (m+1) (which lies
T BM BM
2 2 opt
between " /(6+1) and " /6).
BM BM
The optimal common central bank
The optimal price stability weight of the CCB is found by differentiating (4.3) with respect
to its price stability weight:
ME(V )/M" = (1/" )(1/< +1/" )[T K + T (F +F /n)/< ], i=1,..,n, (4.5)S,i BM BM gS 3 4 µ T
2 2 2 2 2 2
where T and T are as defined in (3.6). Just as with an independent national central bank, the3 4
optimal price stability weight lies between " /(6+1) and " /6. Monetary unification (i.e. an
BS BS
increase in the number of participants in the union, n) raises the optimal price stability weight by
reducing the variance of the common shocks (F +F /n) and thus the ratio (F +F /n)/ K (seeµ T µ T
2 2 2 2
footnote 18). Moreover, if idiosyncratic shocks become more important relative to common
shocks, union-wide monetary policy becomes less effective in stabilizing (or 'financing') the
23
stochastic components of the government financing requirements. With monetary policy becoming a
less effective stabilization tool, the union members should appoint a more conservative central
banker so that monetary policy focusses more on credibility and less on flexibility.
24
Enlarging a monetary union while optimally adjusting monetary arrangements not only
promotes price stability by reducing the average level of inflation but also reduces the variability of
inflation. However, the other components of welfare (i.e. output and public spending) suffer as
monetary policy contributes less to the financing of the government financing requirement.
Moreover, the variability of both output and spending increases as monetary policy provides less
stabilization and fiscal policy takes over part of the stabilization task.
25
The overall effect of these changes on the various components in welfare is that monetary
unification with optimal adjustment of monetary institutions unambiguously reduces welfare.
26
Intuitively, the optimally designed central bank, which trades off credibility and flexibility, does
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The assumption that K = K, i, ensures that the optimal transfers only depend on country-specific shock27 i
components. Hence, transfers are used purely for insurance purposes and are zero from an ex ante point of
view.
This welfare gain is due to the international transfer system rather than monetary unification. With
28
decentralized national monetary policymaking, the international transfer system would yield the same welfare
gain. However, in the presence of such an optimally designed transfer system, transfering monetary policy to
the central level of the union would not yield any welfare losses since international transfers rather than
national monetary policy would stabilize country-specific shocks.
not provide enough stabilization. By further reducing stabilization, a larger union yields a first-
order welfare loss.
5. International transfers
This section studies the potential role of a supranational transfer system in insuring
countries against country-specific shocks. Hence, not only monetary policy but also parts of fiscal
policy are centralized. Transfer payments occur after shocks have realized but before policies are
selected. The deterministic components of the government financing requirements and the variances
of the idiosyncratic shocks are uniform across the union. In setting transfers, a supranational
27
authority weighs all countries equally. Accordingly, optimal transfers {t } minimize (1/n)3 Vi i =1 i =1 S,i
n n
subject to the condition that 3 t #0 (i.e. feasibility) and the modified government financingi =1 i
n
requirements,
K - (µ+T )/< - t = [(x -x )/<] + 6B + [g -g ] + [B-B ], i=1,..,n. (2.6N)i i i i i i
e
The quadratic welfare losses imply that optimal transfers equate ex post welfare losses across the
union. Thus, the optimal combination of transfers amounts to
t = (T - T )/<, i=1,..,n. (5.1)i A i
This implies that individual countries are perfectly insured against the country-specific shock
components. The associated expected welfare loss is given by
(5.2)
With fixed preference weights (including a given " ), a larger union raises welfare because it
BM
increases the potential to insure idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, whereas monetary unification without
international transfers harms welfare, it raises welfare if it is accompanied by a properly designed
transfer system.
28
Just as in the absence of international transfers, the optimal central bank becomes more
16
conservative in a larger union. The reason is that a larger union implies more effective stabilization
through international transfers. This reduces the role of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy.
Hence, in trading off credibility and flexibility, the optimal central bank should focus more on
credibility. In contrast to the case without international transfers, the variability of also output and
spending is reduced because the enhanced stabilization performed by the transfers decreases output
variability. Moreover, it reduces the need to employ national fiscal policies as a stabilization tool,
thereby decreasing the variability of public spending.
The enhanced insurance through an international transfer system implies that a larger union
with optimally designed monetary institutions and international transfers enhances welfare. Hence,
just as with fixed monetary institutions, a larger union is welfare enhancing only if it involves
international transfers.
6. Conclusions
In investigating the macroeconomic implications of monetary unification, this paper
focussed on the links between fiscal and monetary policy in stabilizing and boosting employment.
In the presence of endogenous fiscal policies, employment is stabilized not only through the
traditional channel of inflation surprises but also through variations in seigniorage revenues and
public spending. With national policymaking, we found that, in contrast to Rogoff (1985), the
optimally designed central bank may be less conservative than society if real money holdings are
large and supply shocks are important compared to the deterministic component of the government
financing requirement (which is affected by spending targets, public debt service, lump-sum taxes,
and non-tax distortions in output and labor markets).
In the absence of international transfers, monetary unification implies less effective
stabilization of country-specific shocks. This raises the variability of not only output but also
public spending as national fiscal policies bear more of the burden of stabilizing country-specific
shocks. Unless national central banks attach a very low priority to price stability and thus focus too
much on stabilization, less effective stabilization in a monetary union reduces overall welfare
compared to national monetary policymaking.
We studied also the optimal design of monetary institutions. We found that, compared to
the national central banks, the optimally designed common central bank should focus more on price
stability because monetary policy becomes a less effective stabilization tool in a monetary union.
This explains why European central bankers generally favor European monetary unification.
If monetary unification is accompanied by an optimally designed international transfer
system, the implied insurance of country-specific shocks actually results in more effective rather
than less effective stabilization, thereby reducing the variability of not only inflation but also
output and spending. Accordingly, monetary unification raises welfare only if it is accompanied by
a properly designed system of international transfers. This result suggests an important relationship
17
In the United States, the federal fiscal system serves as a transfer system stabilizing region-specific
29
shocks (see, e.g., Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1991). Europe, however, lacks such an insurance mechanism.
between monetary and political integration because international transfers (i.e. centralizing not only
monetary policy but also parts of fiscal policy) are likely to be feasible only in a union with
sufficient political integration. In addition to political obstacles, another (and related) barrier to
29
such a transfer system is that country-specific shocks may be difficult to observe. In particular,
individual countries are likely to possess more information on these shocks than the surpanational
transfer agency. This may give rise to moral hazard. These topics are left for future research.
Another important direction for further research is to allow governments to run deficits or
surpluses. Within such a framework, stabilization could occur not only through international
transfers, monetary policy, or variations in public spending, but also through public debt policy.
Thus, we could study the role of ceilings on public debt, which currently serve as entrance
requirements for the EMU. These debt targets may imply benefits in terms of avoiding excessive
accumulation of public debt in the presence of myopic policymakers (see Beetsma and Bovenberg,
1995b). However, they may impose also costs by reducing the ability of debt policy to stabilize
country-specific shocks.
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Table 1: Outcomes of the output gap and the policy instruments
variable: centralized discretion decentralized discretion
(x -x )/<i i
6Bi
g -gi i
B -Bi i
e
variable: monetary union
(x -x )/<i i
6B
g -gi i
B-Be
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Table 2: Variances of output and policy instruments
variable: centralized discretion decentralized discretion
* (F +F )/< * (F +F )/<µ Ti
2 2 2
µ Ti
2 2 2
B
g
x
variable: monetary union (F =F , i=1,..,n)
Ti T
2 2
B
g
x
Definitions: See Table 1
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The linear-quadratic structure of the model ensures that the optimal policy mix follows uniquely from
30
the first-order conditions.
Technical appendices:
A: Derivation of the outcomes under centralized discretion
Substitute (2.2) for x into (2.4). The Lagrangian of the government of country i is:i
£ = ½ [" B +(<(B -B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) +" (g -g ) ]+8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B -2 ]. (A.1)F,i BF i i i i i i gS i i i i i i i i
2 e 2 2
The first order conditions for B , J and g are, respectively,i i i
30
" B + <(<(B -B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) = 68 , (A.2)
BF i i i i i i i
e
-<(<(B -B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) = 8 , (A.3)i i i i i i
e
" (g -g ) = -8 , (A.4)gS i i i
Eliminate 8 from the system (A.2)-(A.4) and add the government budget constraint to the system to obtain,i
" B = - (6+1) <(<(B -B -J )+(µ+T )-x ), (A.5)
BF i i i i i i
e
<(<(B -B +J )+x -(µ+T )) = " ( g -g ), (A.6)i i i i i gS i i
e
g +(1+D)d = J +6B +2 . (A.7)i i i i i
The solution of the system is derived in two steps. In the first step, we compute the deterministic components
of the policy instruments (in other words, we compute the expected values of the policy instruments), while,
in the second step, we compute the stochastic components of the policy instruments.
As for the first step, take expectations (denoted by superscript "e"; note that we assume rationality of
expectations, so that subjective and model induced expectations are equal to each other) of both sides of the
equations of the system (A.5)-(A.7):
" B = - (6+1) <(-<J - x ), (A.5N)
BF i i i
e e
<(<J +x ) = " ( g -g ), (A.6N)i i gS i i
e e
g +(1+D)d = J +6B +2 . (A.7N)i i i i i
e e e
Rewrite (A.5N)-(A.7N). The resulting system is:
6B = (6(6+1)< /" ) (J +x /<), (A.8)i BF i i
e 2 e
g -g = (< /" ) (J +x /<), (A.9)i i gS i i
e 2 e
K = (J +x /<) + (6B ) + (g -g ). (A.10)i i i i i i
e e e
Substitute the right hand sides of (A.8) and (A.9) for (6B ) and (g -g ), respectively, into (A.10). The resulti i i
e e
can be solved for (J +x /<) as a function of K . Using this result, the solutions for (6B ) and (g -g ) theni i i i i i
e e e
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follow from (A.8) and (A.9), respectively. Hence, the solution of the system (A.8) - (A.10) is given by:
6B = [(6(6+1)/" )/D] K , (A.11)i BF i
e
J +x /< = [(1/< )/D] K , (A.12)i i i
e 2
g -g = [(1/" )/D] K , (A.13)i i gS i
e
where D / 6(6+1)/" +1/< +1/" , as defined in the main text.
BF gS
2
Denote by superscript "d" the deviation of a variable from its expected value (i.e. x /x-x , where x isd e
an arbitrary variable). Subtract equations (A.5N)-(A.7N) from their counterparts of system (A.5)-(A.7) to yield:
" B = (6+1) < (-B +J -(µ+T )/<), (A.5O)
BF i i i i
d 2 d d
< (-B +J -(µ+T )/<) = -" g , (A.6O)2 d d di i i gS i
g = J +6B . (A.7O)i i i
d d d
Substitute (A.7O) into (A.5O), to yield:
< (-B +J -(µ+T )/<) = -" (J +6B ), (A.14)2 d d d di i i gS i i
Combine (A.5O) and (A.14) to yield,
[" /(6+1)] B = -" (J +6B ), (A.15)
BF i gS i i
d d d
which can be rewritten as,
J = -[(" /" )/(6+1) + 6] B . (A.16)i BF gS i
d d
Hence, the system to be solved consists of equations (A.5O), (A.7O) and (A.16). Substitute the right hand side
of (A.16) for J into (A.5O). The resulting equation can be solved for B to yield:i i
d d
6B = - [(6(6+1)/" )/D ] [(µ+T )/<], (A.17)i BF i
d *
where D / (6+1) /" +1/< +1/" , as defined in the main text. Combine (A.17) with (A.16) to yield,2 2
BF gS
J = [(6(6+1)/" +1/" )/D ] [(µ+T )/<]. (A.18)i BF gS i
d *
Next, combine (A.7O), (A.17) and (A.18) to yield,
g = [(1/" )/D ] [(µ+T )/<]. (A.19)i gS i
d *
The solution of 6B , as given in Table 1, is the sum of the right hand sides of (A.11) and (A.17). Similarly,i
the solution of J +x /< is the sum of the right hand sides of (A.12) and (A.18), while g -g follows uponi i i i
subtracting the right hand side of (A.19) from the right side of (A.13). Finally, we can write
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( x -x )/< = -B + (J +x /<) - (µ+T )/<. (A.20)i i i i i i
d
The solution of (x -x )/< follows upon combining (A.17), the solution of (J +x /<) and (A.20).i i i i
Society's expected welfare loss follows upon substitution of the solutions for B , x -x and g -g intoi i i i i
(2.3):
(A.21)
Expression (3.1) follows immediately using the facts that K is non-stochastic and that the shocks have zeroi
expected value and are uncorrelated with each other.
B: Derivation of the outcomes under decentralized discretion
(single-country case and monetary union)
The single-country case is obtained by setting n=1 in the outcomes for a monetary union (note that
we have K = K and T =T if n=1).A i A i
Substitute (2.2), i=1,..,n, into (4.1). Hence, the CCB selects B to minimize
½ {" B + 3 [(<(B-B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) +" (g -g ) ]/n}. (B.1)
BM i =1 i i i gM i i
2 n e 2 2
The first-order condition for the inflation rate selected by the CCB is:
" B + (1/n) 3 <(<(B-B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) = 0. (B.2)
BM i =1 i i i
n e
This can be solved to yield the CCB's reaction function (4.2):
(B.3)
The Lagrangian associated with government i's problem is:
£ = ½ [" B +(<(B-B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) +" (g -g ) ]+8 [g +(1+D)d -J -6B-2 ]. (B.4)F,i BF i i i gS i i i i i i i
2 e 2 2
The first order conditions with respect to J and g are, respectively,i i
-<(<(B-B -J )+(µ+T )-x ) = 8 , (B.5)e i i i i
" (g -g ) = -8 , (B.6)gS i i i
Eliminate 8 from the system (B.5) and (B.6) to yield,i
" ( g -g ) = <(<(B -B+J )+x -(µ+T )). (B.7)gS i i i i i
e
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We employ again the two-step procedure. To solve for the deterministic components of the outcome, take
expectations of (B.3), (B.7) and (2.5N) to yield (after rewriting) the following system:
6B = (6< /" ) (1/n)3 (J +x /<), (B.8)e 2 n e
BM i =1 i i
g -g = (< /" ) (J +x /<), (B.9)i i gS i i
e 2 e
K = (J +x /<) + (6B ) + (g -g ). (B.10)i i i i i
e e e
Combine (B.9) and (B.10) to yield:
J +x /< = (1+< /" ) ( K -6B ). (B.11)i i gS i
e 2 -1 e
Substitute (B.11), i=1,..,n, into (B.8). The resulting equation can be solved to yield:
6B = [(6/" )/N ] (1/n)3 K = [(6/" )/N ] K , (B.12)e n
BM D i =1 i BM D A
where N /6/" +1/< +1/" , as defined in the main text. Substitute (B.12) into (B.11) and work out further:D BM gS
2
(B.13)
Combine (B.9) and (B.13) to obtain:
(B.14)
From (B.3), (B.7) and (2.5N) we obtain the system in terms of deviations from expected values:
B = [< /(" +< )] (1/n)3 [J -(µ+T )/<], (B.15)d 2 2 n d
BM i =1 i i
< [-B +J -(µ+T )/<] = -" g , (B.16)
2 d d d
i i gS i
g = 6B +J . (B.17)i i
d d d
Substitute (B.17) into (B.16):
< [-B +J -(µ+T )/<] = -" (6B +J ), (B.18)
2 d d d d
i i gS i
and solve for J ,i
d
J = (1/< +1/" ) [(1/" -6/< )B + (1/" )(µ+T )/<]. (B.19)i gS gS gS i
d 2 -1 2 d
Substitute (B.19) into (B.15) to eliminate J , and solve:i
d
B = [-(1/" )/N ] [(µ+T )/<], (B.20)
d *
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where N /(6+1)/" +1/< +1/" , as defined in the main text. Substitute (B.20) into (B.19) to eliminate B .D BM gS
* 2 d
Some algebra then gives,
(B.21)
Substitute (B.20) and (B.21) into (B.17) to obtain:
(B.22)
Having solved the systems in terms of expectations and deviations from expectations, we can now
combine the results to obtain the final outcomes. Combine (B.12) and (B.20) to obtain the solution of 6B:
(B.23)
Combine (B.13) and (B.21) to obtain the outcome for J +x /<:i i
(B.24)
Combine (B.14) and (B.22) to obtain the outcome for g -g :i i
(B.25)
As one can write
( x -x )/< = -B + (J +x /<) - (µ+T )/<, (B.26)i i i i i
d
we can use (B.20) and (B.24) to obtain the outcome for (x -x )/<:i i
(B.27)
Under the assumption that K = K, i, we have that E(V ) = ½ * Expected Value ofi S,i
1/<
ND
˜K& 1/<
N(D
µ%TA
<
&
1/<
1/<2%1/"gS
Ti&TA
<
2
%
"gS
1/"gS
ND
˜K&
1/"gS
N(D
µ%TA
<
&
1/"gS
1/<2%1/"gS
Ti&TA
<
2
E(VS,i) '
"
BS/"
2
BM%1/<2%1/"gS
2N 2D
˜K2 %
"
BS/"
2
BM%1/<2%1/"gS
2(N(D)2
E
µ%TA
<
2
%
1
2(1/<2%1/"gS)
E
Ti&TA
<
2
,
E(VS,i) '
"
BS/"
2
BM%1/<2%1/"gS
2N 2D
˜K2 %
"
BS/"
2
BM%1/<2%1/"gS
2(N(D)2
F
2
µ%F
2
T
/n
<
2
%
1
2(1/<2%1/"gS)
(n&1)F2
T
/n
<
2
,
26
Note that E(µ+3T /n)(T -3T /n) = E(T3T /n - 3T /n ) = (1/n)E(T )-(1/n )3 E(T ) = 0, where we31 2 2 2 2 2j j i j j i j j j j i j j
have used the assumption that the common shock is uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic shocks and repeatedly
used the assumption that the idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated with each other.
. (B.28)
Assume that F =F , i. Hence, we have that
Ti T
2 2
(B.29)
where we have made use of the fact that (µ+T )/< and (T -T )/< are uncorrelated under the assumption thatA i A
the idiosyncratic shocks have equal variance. From (B.29) it follows that,
(B.30)
where we have made use of the assumption that the shocks are all uncorrelated with each other. Expression
31
(B.30) can be rewritten as (4.3).
